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This paper  aims  to  make  two  contributions  to the  sustainability  transitions  literature,  in  particular  the
Geels  and  Schot  (2007.  Res.  Policy  36(3),  399)  transition  pathways  typology.  First,  it reformulates  and
differentiates  the  typology  through  the  lens  of  endogenous  enactment,  identifying  the  main  patterns
for  actors,  formal  institutions,  and  technologies.  Second,  it suggests  that  transitions  may  shift  between
pathways,  depending  on  struggles  over  technology  deployment  and institutions.  Both  contributions  are
demonstrated  with a comparative  analysis  of  unfolding  low-carbon  electricity  transitions  in Germany
and  the  UK  between  1990–2014.  The  analysis  shows  that  Germany  is on a  substitution  pathway,  enacted
by  new  entrants  deploying  small-scale  renewable  electricity  technologies  (RETs),  while  the  UK  is on  a
transformation  pathway,  enacted  by incumbent  actors  deploying  large-scale  RETs.  Further  analysis  showsulti-level perspective that the  German  transition  has  recently  shifted  from  a ‘stretch-and-transform’  substitution  pathway  to  a
‘ﬁt-and-conform’  pathway,  because  of  a ﬁghtback  from  utilities  and  altered  institutions.  It also  shows  that
the UK  transition  moved  from  moderate  to substantial  incumbent  reorientation,  as  government  policies
became  stronger.  Recent  policy  changes,  however,  substantially  downscaled  UK  renewables  support,
which  is  likely  to shift  the  transition  back  to  weaker  reorientation.
ublis© 2016  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
Early work on socio-technical transitions (Rip and Kemp, 1998;
eels, 2004) emphasized the importance of alignments between
evelopments at multiple levels, characterized in the multi-
evel perspective (MLP) as niche-innovations, existing regimes
nd exogenous landscape. Geels and Schot (2007) subsequently
uggested that different kinds of alignments lead to different
ransition pathways. They constructed a typology based on com-
inations between two dimensions: the timing and nature of
ulti-level interactions. This led them to distinguish four transition
athways: (1) technological substitution, based on disruptive niche-
nnovations which are sufﬁciently developed when landscape
ressure occurs, (2) transformation,  in which landscape pressures
timulate incumbent actors to gradually adjust the regime, when
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1612757374.
E-mail address: frank.geels@manchester.ac.uk (F.W. Geels).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.01.015
048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uhed  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
niche-innovations are not sufﬁciently developed, (3) reconﬁgura-
tion, based on symbiotic niche-innovations that are incorporated
into the regime and trigger further (architectural) adjustments
under landscape pressure, (4) de-alignment and re-alignment, in
which major landscape pressures destabilize the regime when
niche-innovations are insufﬁciently developed; the prolonged co-
existence of niche-innovations is followed by re-creation of a new
regime around one of them. Geels and Schot (2007) further pro-
posed that a transition may  shift between pathways: “If landscape
pressure takes the form of ‘disruptive change’, a sequence of tran-
sition pathways is likely, beginning with transformation, then
leading to reconﬁguration, and possibly followed by substitution
or de-alignment and re-alignment” (p. 413).
While this pathways typology has been useful, it is mainly for-
mulated in processual and phenomenological terms. The typology
pays limited explicit attention to agency and institutions. The inﬂu-
ence of landscape developments arguably depends not only on
timing (compared to niche and regime developments), but also on
interpretation and mobilization by actors. Furthermore, whether
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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This basic conceptualisation of the enactment of trajectories
informs our reformulation of transition pathways below, which
vary in terms of who the dominant actors are and how they
shape the reproduction or change of rules and institutions. Thisig. 1. Percentage of UK and German renewable electricity, 1990–2014 (data from
UKES and AG Energiebilanzen (http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/, last accessed
une 30, 2015).
iche-innovations are ‘symbiotic’ or ‘disruptive’ depends not only
n technical characteristics, but also on how such innovations are
onﬁgured and institutionally embedded. The current pathways
ypology represents a ‘global’ (or ‘outside-in’) conceptual logic,
hich Poole and Van de Ven (1989: 643) characterize as depicting
the overall course of development of an innovation” which “takes
s its unit of analysis the overall trajectories, paths, phases, or stages
n the development of an innovation”. They contrast this with a
local’ (or ‘inside-out’) conceptual logic which depicts “the immedi-
te action processes that create short-run developmental patterns”
nd focuses on “the micro ideas, decisions, actions or events of
articular developmental episodes”. Building on their suggestion
hat process theories should ideally have both logics, the paper’s
rst aim is to develop the ‘local’ logic of the transition pathways
ypology. So, we aim to reformulate and differentiate the exist-
ng transition pathways in terms of endogenous enactment, using
he conceptual categories from Geels (2004), who  distinguished
etween: (1) actors and social groups, (2) rules and institutions, and
3) technologies and wider socio-technical system. Our reformula-
ion strategy, ﬁrst, brings together and systematizes insights from
ther transition papers and, second, imports some ideas from other
iteratures. The second aim is to develop alternative understand-
ngs of shifts between transition pathways, which depend less on
xternal landscape pressure and more on shifting actor coalitions,
truggles, and adjustments in formal rules and institutions.
To demonstrate our contributions, we present a comparative
nalysis of the unfolding low-carbon electricity transitions in the
K and Germany. Both countries have developed ambitious elec-
ricity transition plans. Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
ccident, the German government adopted an ofﬁcial energy transi-
ion strategy, the Energiewende,  which included a nuclear phase-out
y 2022 and renewable electricity goals of 35% by 2020, 40–45%
y 2025, 55–60% by 2035 and 80% by 2050. The 2008 UK Climate
hange Act committed to 80% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG)
missions by 2050. The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009) arti-
ulated a target of 30% renewable electricity by 2020 and almost
omplete decarbonisation of electricity by 2030. Both countries
ave made some progress, with the contribution of renewables to
ower generation increasing between 1990 and 2014 from 3.6% to
6.2% in Germany and from 1.9% to 19.1% in the UK (Fig. 1).
We will show that both countries followed very different transi-
ion pathways, with Germany enacting a technological substitution
athway (which we characterize as ‘unleashing new entrants’) and
he UK a transformation pathway (which we characterize as ‘work-
ng with incumbents’). Analysing actors, institutions, and deployedicy 45 (2016) 896–913 897
technologies, we  also show how struggles and conﬂicts led to shifts
between transition pathways in both countries.
Section 2 describes our conceptual reformulations and differ-
entiations of the transition pathways typology. Section 3 discusses
case-selection and data sources. Sections 4 and 5 present analyses
of the UK and German electricity transitions. Section 6 discusses
ﬁndings. Section 7 offers conclusions.
2. Conceptual perspective
2.1. Background assumptions
Before reformulating the transition pathways typology (Section
2.2), we  brieﬂy explicate our assumptions about agency and indi-
cate how a ‘local’ (enactment) logic can be related to the ‘global’ MLP
logic (of trajectories and alignments). This is also important because
some scholars have (incorrectly in our view) claimed that the MLP
does not accommodate agency, conﬂict and struggle. Drawing on
insights from science and technology studies (STS), evolutionary
economics and neo-institutional theory, Geels (2004) distinguished
between: (1) actors and social groups, (2) rules and institutions, (3)
technologies and socio-technical system, and articulated dynamic
interactions. He used the metaphor of socially embedded ‘game
playing’ to emphasize the moves and countermoves of actors and
social groups, which are constrained by ‘rules of the game’ and
oriented towards reproducing or modifying elements of socio-
technical systems. “In each round actors make ‘moves’, i.e. they do
something, e.g. make investment decisions about R&D directions,
introduce new technologies in the market, develop new regula-
tions, propose new scientiﬁc hypotheses. These actions maintain
or change aspects of ST-systems. The dynamic is game-like because
actors react to each other’s moves” (Geels, 2004: 909). These games
include interpretations and power: “Different actors do not have
equal power or strength. They have unequal resources (e.g. money,
knowledge, tools) and opportunities to realize their purposes and
interest, and inﬂuence social rules. The framework leaves room for
conﬂict and power struggles. After all, there is something at stake
in the games” (p. 909).
Geels and Schot (2010) further elaborated these notions and
articulated the link between agency and ﬁeld-level trajectories.
They suggested that a trajectory can be conceptualized as a
sequence of events (or ‘event chain’) and that each event can be
analysed in terms of more speciﬁc ‘morphogenetic cycles’ (Archer,
1982), constituted by four successive mechanisms (Fig. 2): (1)
structural conditioning of actors by existing rules and institutions,
(2) social interaction between actors (search, learning, collabora-
tion, sense-making, conﬂict, moves, countermoves), (3) structural
elaboration (reproduction of rules and institutions or efforts to
modify them via institutional entrepreneurship), and (4) external-
ization and institutionalization (acceptance and retention of rule
changes). This conceptualization means that trajectories in the MLP
are always enacted and that even stable trajectories require con-
tinuous effort by actors (via reproduction).Fig. 2. Trajectory as ﬁeld-level event chain, resulting from successive morpho-
genetic cycles (Geels and Schot, 2010: 52).
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beliefs and identities)1. This reorientation process often proceeds
gradually, ﬁrst through defensive hedging, then diversiﬁcation,
then full reorientation (Geels, 2014b; Geels and Penna, 2015).98 F.W. Geels et al. / Resear
asic conceptualisation also means that transitions can be ana-
ysed with lenses of different granularity (Geels and Schot, 2010):
1) aggregate explanations in terms of alignments of trajectories
ithin and between niche, regime and landscape levels, (2) expla-
ations of trajectories in terms of event-chains and rounds of moves
nd counter-moves, (3) explanations of particular events or local
rojects by zooming in on speciﬁc actors and (local) contexts.
The current pathways logic, discussed in Section 1, is mainly
ormulated through the ﬁrst lens. Below we try to reformulate dif-
erent transition pathways through the second lens, focusing on
he interactions between actors, rules and institutions and tech-
ologies, and how these result in different kinds of trajectories.
he third lens has received attention in the strategic niche man-
gement literature (Hoogma et al., 2002), but may  be less useful for
he conceptualisation of transition pathways which refer to more
ggregate patterns over longer time periods.
.2. Reformulating and differentiating transition pathways
This section reformulates and differentiates the four transition
athways from Geels and Schot (2007) in terms of actors, technolo-
ies and institutions. We  thus make two simpliﬁcations compared
o Geels (2004). First, while the analytical style remains socio-
echnical, the empirical focus is on technologies rather than broader
ystems. This focus stems from the case demarcation, which is
bout electricity generation rather than the entire electricity system
which would also include the grid and electricity use). Second, we
ocus primarily on formal rules and institutions rather than normat-
ve and cultural-cognitive institutions. This simpliﬁcation enables
s to mobilize ideas from neo-institutional political science with
egard to changes in formal rules and institutions. But it also means
hat interpretive and discursive dimensions receive somewhat less
ttention, which thus forms a limitation of our reformulations.
Thelen (2003) characterized most of the institutional litera-
ure in political science as following a punctuated equilibrium
iew, in which institutions either develop through incremental
djustments (based on policy learning) or are disrupted by exter-
al shocks, followed by rapid substitution of new institutions. She
dditionally proposed four other mechanisms that go beyond this
ichotomy: layering, in which new institutions are layered on top
f existing arrangements without affecting their core logic; drift, in
hich on-the-ground implementation gradually changes policies-
n-use without any ofﬁcial decision; conversion,  in which the
oals of existing policies are adjusted, while instruments remain
nchanged; displacement, in which new institutions slowly over-
ake existing ones. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) further suggested
hat ‘layering’ and ‘drift’ stay closer to existing institutions, while
displacement’ and ‘conversion’ represent more signiﬁcant change.
hey also suggested that institutional changes often entail con-
icts between incumbents, subversives and other actors, which
ay  involve veto power, coalition building, and other means of
locking or facilitating change. So, combined with the earlier mech-
nisms (incremental adjustment, disruption), we  suggest that the
eo-institutional literature offers several change mechanisms that
an be usefully applied in a reconceptulisation of the four transi-
ion pathways (see also Dolata, 2013). For the ﬁrst two pathways,
e aim at reformulation and differentiation, based on particular
ombinations of change mechanisms for actors, technologies and
nstitutions. For the last two pathways, our contributions remain
imited to reformulation.
.2.1. Substitution pathway
In the original formulation of the substitution pathway, niche
nd regime technologies initially develop separately (because rad-
cal niche-innovations are shielded by supportive policies) and
re carried by different actors (new entrants and incumbents).licy 45 (2016) 896–913
The actual overthrow involves direct struggles between technolo-
gies and associated actors, often in the context of broader landscape
changes that affect the selection criteria and institutions in main-
stream markets.
We propose further differentiations in the enactment of the sub-
stitution pathway with regard to ‘actors’ and ‘institutions’. With
regard to actors, the ‘normal’ Schumpeterian pattern is that new
ﬁrms struggle against established ﬁrms. Socio-technical transition
scholars, however, have found that radical sustainability innova-
tions may  also be developed and deployed by outsiders such as
activists, social movements and citizens with normative motiva-
tions (Seyfang and Smith, 2007). New entry may also come from
incumbents that diversify from other sectors, e.g. Internet compa-
nies moving into renewable energy or driverless cars.
With regard to institutions, the substitution pathway may
follow two  patterns. The ﬁrst pattern occurs with limited institu-
tional change [incremental adjustment; layering], when innovations
with better price/performance characteristics disrupt existing
technologies. Smith and Raven (2012) call this a ‘ﬁt-and-conform’
pattern, in which niche-innovations are developed to ﬁt existing
rules and institutions. In the second pattern, which Smith and
Raven (2012) call ‘stretch-and-transform’, rules and institutions
are adjusted to suit the niche-innovation [disruption; displacement].
These institutional changes are likely to involve power struggles,
socio-political mobilization and counter-mobilization (Schneiberg
and Lounsbury, 2008; Geels, 2014a).
2.2.2. Transformation pathway
The transformation pathway consists of gradual reorientation
of the existing regime through adjustments by incumbent actors
in the context of landscape pressure, societal debates and tighten-
ing institutions. We  propose further differentiations with regard to
actors, technologies and institutions.
While Geels and Schot (2007) emphasized adjustments through
incremental changes in search routines and technology, we  pro-
pose that incumbent actors may  also reorient towards radical
niche-innovations. So, incumbent actors do not necessarily remain
‘locked in’ to the existing regime, as is commonly assumed in
the MLP. Instead, they can change strategic direction and reorient
themselves, as the strategy literature has suggested with notions
such as ‘exploration-exploitation’ (March, 1991) and ‘ambidex-
trous organization’. We  thus go beyond the established dichotomy
that incumbents do incremental innovation and new entrants do
radical innovations (see also Bergek et al., 2013; Berggren et al.,
2015). We  further suggest that incumbent reorientation can have
different ‘depths’, depending on the kinds of organizational ele-
ments that are adjusted (Geels, 2014b): (a) search routines and
standard-operating procedures, (b) technical capabilities and eco-
nomic positioning strategy, (c) beliefs, identity, mission, business
model. The ‘deeper’ organizational elements are more difﬁcult to
change, entailing different kinds of processes and causal mecha-
nisms (Fig. 3).
With regard to technologies, our differentiation not only
includes incremental change in the existing technology, but also two
other options: (1) competence additions (Geels, 2006) or ‘creative
accumulation’ (Bergek et al., 2013), which refers to the integra-
tion of new knowledge within existing regimes, (2) reorientation
towards new technologies (with or without changes in deeper1 This second option has a similarity with the technical substitution pathway,
because both involve a shift from old to new technologies. They differ, however, in
terms of enactment.
F.W. Geels et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 896–913 899
 reorie
T
s
r
c
a
i
f
s
‘
e
a
a
2
e
W
t
b
(
i
o
i
t
t
c
u
c
i
cFig. 3. Dynamics of strategic
he speed and degree of reorientation depends on the strength of
ocio-political pressures and perceived market opportunities.
With regard to institutions, we suggest that different depths of
eorientation are associated with different degrees of institutional
hange (Geels and Penna, 2015). Incremental technical change and
dd-ons are likely to involve limited institutional change (‘layer-
ng’). Partial reorientation (based on technical diversiﬁcation) and
ull reorientation (based additionally on changing beliefs and mis-
ion) entail higher degrees of institutional change (‘conversion’,
displacement’), which enhance pressure on incumbents. Differ-
nt degrees of institutional pressure in the transformation pathway
re likely to involve struggles between policymakers and industry
ctors (Smink et al., 2015).
.2.3. Reconﬁguration pathway
In the reconﬁguration pathway, niche-innovations and the
xisting regime combine to transform the system’s architecture.
e  propose some minor reformulations, rather than differentia-
ions. In terms of actors, this pathway can involve new alliances
etween incumbents and new entrants rather than overthrow
Rothaermel, 2001)2.
In terms of technologies, niche-innovations may  initially be
ncorporated as ‘modular innovation’ (Henderson and Clark, 1990)
r as ‘add-on’ to existing technologies (which thus has similar-
ties to the ‘transformation’ pathway). Subsequently, however,
hese new technologies may  create unintended problems or oppor-
unities that invite further changes, thus triggering ‘innovation
ascades’ (Berkers and Geels, 2011) that substantially reconﬁg-
re system components and their relations. Knock-on effects, ‘new
ombinations’ between multiple innovations, second-order learn-
ng processes (which change beliefs and goals), and unintended
2 These alliances often entail conﬂicts because of power differentials and
onﬂicting interests.ntation (Geels, 2014b: 272).
consequences give this transition pathway an open-ended charac-
ter.
Reconﬁguration processes are likely to start with limited insti-
tutional change (‘layering’), followed by more substantial change
(‘drift’, ‘conversion’) as actors encounter new problems, change
their goals and see new opportunities. Institutional change may
involve struggles between new entrants and incumbents to suit
their interests.
2.2.4. De-alignment and re-alignment pathway
In the de-alignment and re-alignment pathway, the existing
regime is disrupted by external shocks, which is followed by the
rise of multiple niche-innovations and constituencies, one of which
gradually becomes dominant. This pathway has not been investi-
gated much, so we only propose some reformulations with regard
to actors, technologies and institutions.
New entrants and incumbents do not engage in a head-on con-
frontation, but are temporally separated: incumbent actors lose
faith in the regime’s viability (because of major shocks) before being
challenged by new entrants. The core process of regime destabil-
isation has not been investigated much (see Turnheim and Geels,
2013, for an exception). More generally, transitions research has not
yet paid much attention to the role of really large shocks (e.g. wars,
population displacements, economic collapse), despite the sugges-
tion by Freeman and Perez (1988) that major paradigm shifts often
involve societal crises.
The destabilisation and decline of the existing technology cre-
ates space for the emergence of (several) radical niche-innovations,
which compete more with each other than with the ‘old’ technol-
ogy.
In terms of institutions, the existing (punctuated equilibrium)
literature (Meyer, 1982) suggests that when environmental jolts
disrupt existing institutions, actors engage in search, learning and
struggles to establish new institutions. Extremely large shocks,
however, may  create prolonged uncertainty because the absence
of institutional templates hinders adaptation and learning:
900 F.W. Geels et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 896–913
Table 1
Reformulated and differentiated transition pathways.
Transition pathway Actors Technologies Rules and institutions
(1) Substitution New ﬁrms struggle against incumbent
ﬁrms, leading to overthrow
Radical innovation(s) substituting
existing technology
Limited institutional change, implying
that niche-innovation needs to
compete in existing selection
environment (‘ﬁt-and-conform’)
(‘Incremental adjustment’, ‘Layering’)
Different kinds of ‘new entrants’ (e.g.
citizens, communities, social
movement actors, incumbents from
different sectors) replace incumbents
Creation of new rules and institutions
to suit the niche-innovation
(‘stretch-and-transform’) (‘Disruption’,
‘Displacement’)
(2) Transformation Incumbents reorient incrementally by
adjusting search routines and
procedures
Incremental improvement in existing
technologies (leading to major
performance enhancement over long
time period).
Limited institutional change
(‘Layering’)
Incorporation of symbiotic
niche-innovations and add-ons
(competence-adding, creative
accumulation)
Incumbents reorient substantially, to
radically new technology or, even
more deeply, to new beliefs, mission,
and business model
Reorientation towards new
technologies:
(a) partial reorientation
(diversiﬁcation) with incumbents
developing both old and new
technologies
(b) full reorientation, leading to
technical substitution
Substantial change in institutions
(‘Conversion’, ‘Displacement’)
(3) Reconﬁguration New alliances between incumbents
and new entrants
From initial add-ons to new
combinations between new and
existing technologies; knock-on effects
and innovation cascades that change
system architecture.
From limited institutional change
(‘Layering’) to more substantial change,
including operational principles
(‘Drift’, ‘Conversion’)
(4) De-alignment and Incumbents collapse because of Decline of old technologies creates
space 
compe
Institutions are disrupted by shocks
s
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t
tre-alignment landscape pressure, creating
opportunities for new entrants
when institution-level change is too extreme, when the under-
lying values, ideologies and norms in society are in question,
and when the economic and political systems are in disarray, it
is difﬁcult for managers to coalesce around a new set of value
commitments and almost impossible to ﬁnd the ‘right’ new
organizing template (Newman, 2000: 605)3.
During the institutional ‘vacuum’, multiple groups and con-
tituencies are likely to struggle over the shape of new institutions.
tability returns when one group (or coalition) prevails.
Table 1 summarizes the reformulated and differentiated tran-
ition pathways along the three categories (actors, technologies,
nstitutions). These reformulated pathways go beyond traditional
ichotomies and provide a more nuanced analytical apparatus to
nalyse unfolding transition processes.
.3. Shifts between pathways
Our reconceptualisation also enables a more ﬂuid understand-
ng of shifts between pathways as transitions unfold, which depends
ess on external landscape change, as in Geels and Schot (2007), and
ore on endogenous enactment. The general starting point is that
ransitions are not teleological and deterministic, but continuously
nacted by and contested between a variety of actors. Both tech-
ology deployment and institutions are continuous sites of struggle
Smith and Raven, 2012), as actors argue for or against the effec-
iveness, costs and desirability of certain technologies, policy goals
3 Newman (2000) suggests that the fall of communism created so many uncer-
ainties that organizations were still in ﬂux ten years later.for several innovations which
te with one another
and replaced, possibly after prolonged
uncertainty (‘Disruption’)
and policy instruments. So, transitions are likely to be non-linear;
two steps forward may  be followed by one step back (or steps in a
different direction if actors change their beliefs and goals or if there
is growing contestation of particular pathways). This idea has been
conﬁrmed in earlier work on major change processes. With regard
to the transition towards welfare states, for instance, Meadowcroft
(2005: 15) found that “periods of rapid growth or innovation alter-
nated with phases of consolidation or stagnation. The development
of the welfare state was not smooth, but uneven and episodic.”
Organization scholars similarly found that social movements cre-
ate new paths through several rounds of protests: “Central to ﬁeld
and path creation is some sort of collective mobilization or move-
ment, not just a single burst of organization, but also waves or
cycles of mobilization and organizational formation” (Schneiberg
and Lounsbury, 2008: 664). Non-linearities also arise from active
delay and resistance strategies from incumbents (Geels, 2014a;
Smink et al., 2015), including the creation of counter-movements.
Our speciﬁc contribution is the suggestion that non-linearities
may  also take the form of shifts between transition pathways as
struggles between actors affect technology deployment and insti-
tutions. Building on Section 2.2, we distinguish several instances of
such shifts, illustrated with examples:
• Transitions may start along the transformation pathway via a
technical add-on, and subsequently morph into a reconﬁguration
pathway as the new technology has wider knock-on effects that
trigger innovation cascades and learning processes that change
actors views, leading them also to lobby for institutional change.
Berkers and Geels (2011), for instance, showed how the architec-
ture and practice of Dutch horticulture was  transformed between
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These nine companies formed the backbone of the German elec-
tricity regime. Eighty regional supply companies and about nine
hundred municipal utilities guaranteed electricity distribution atF.W. Geels et al. / Resear
1960 and 1980 because of successive add-ons, learning processes
and new combinations (e.g. gas-ﬁred heating, artiﬁcial lighting,
artiﬁcial watering systems, new vegetable breeds, CO2 fertiliza-
tion, new kinds of glass panels).
A transition may  start as a ‘ﬁt-and-conform’ substitution path-
way, but gradually morph into a ‘stretch-and-transform’ pathway
as the coalition of niche-actors becomes stronger and is able to
lobby for new institutions that create more favourable condi-
tions. An example of this pattern is the development of offshore
wind in the UK (Kern et al., 2014a) The opposite is also possi-
ble, with a transition changing from a ‘stretch-and-transform’
to a ‘ﬁt-and-conform’ substitution pathway; this may  happen
when ﬁght-back from incumbent actors leads to weaker rules
that require niche-innovations to ﬁt into existing structures. We
will suggest that the German electricity transition is currently
experiencing this shift between pathways.
A transition may  change from a substitution pathway to a recon-
ﬁguration pathway if incumbent actors are able to change the
institutions so that they offer support for continued existence of
regime technologies besides niche-innovations. We  will suggest
that recent German policies, particularly capacity markets, open
the prospect of this shift, as they enable coal to continue besides
renewables.
A transition may  start as an incremental transformation pathway,
based on limited institutional pressure (‘layering’), but subse-
quently morph into a more substantial reorientation pathway
if increasing institutional pressure incentivises incumbent ﬁrms
to diversify or switch towards new technologies. We  will sug-
gest that the UK electricity transition has followed this pattern as
low-carbon policies became stronger (especially between 2008
and 2014). The speed and depth of different variants of the trans-
formation pathway depends on the strength of policy pressure.
Fightback and resistance from incumbents may  weaken policy
pressure and stiﬂe the reorientation, which seems to have hap-
pened very recently (July, 2015) in the UK case.
A transition may  start as a substitution pathway, in which new
entrants challenge incumbent ﬁrms, but subsequently morph
into a transformation pathway if incumbents buy up the small
ﬁrms to control the radical innovation. This pattern happened to
some degree in the 1990s when big car companies bought up
small electric vehicle ﬁrms, like Th!nk (Hoogma et al., 2002).
Actor struggles and shifts between transition pathways are
nﬂuenced by a range of developments: changing composition
nd strength of actor coalitions; learning processes and on-the-
round experiences (e.g. technology deployment going faster or
lower than expected, deployment costs higher or lower than
nticipated); landscape developments (e.g. elections, accidents,
acro-economic trends, commodity price developments).
More generally, actor struggles and the likelihood of transi-
ion pathways, and shifts between them, are also affected by
tatic landscape characteristics, which provide affordance struc-
ures and action possibilities (Geels and Schot, 2010) that shape
ut do not determine action. These static landscape structures
ere mentioned in Van Driel and Schot (2005), but have generally
een overlooked in transition research, which tends to focus on
andscape changes. Especially for comparative research, however,
his category is useful to acknowledge deep-structural differences
etween countries in terms of constitutional structures, policy
tyles, ideologies, and economic structures4. So, even when the
ame kinds of actors are involved, we should expect different
4 This idea also accommodates Marx’s aphorism that ‘men make their own history,
ut not in conditions of their own choosing’.icy 45 (2016) 896–913 901
enactment patterns between countries because static landscape
structures create different affordances and action possibilities.
3. Case selection and data sources
The paper employs a comparative case study methodology,
investigating unfolding electricity transitions in Germany and the
UK. Both transitions will be investigated as longitudinal case stud-
ies (starting in 1990), because transitions are long-term processes
and because the formal transition plans emerged out of preceding
developments, struggles, setbacks, mobilizations and opportuni-
ties. We  selected these countries because they see themselves as
frontrunners in the low-carbon electricity transition, but have very
different proﬁles. Although similar renewable electricity technolo-
gies (RETs) were available in both countries, variations in actors
and institutions led to substantial differences in patterns of RET-
deployment (Figs. 4 and 5). These countries thus form good cases
to test our reformulated and differentiated transition pathways.
Many RETs are scalar technologies and can be deployed in dif-
ferent conﬁgurations. Figs. 4 and 5 show that Germany mainly
deployed small-scale decentralized RETs (onshore wind, solar-PV,
biogas), while the UK mainly deployed large-scale centralized RETs
(onshore wind farms, offshore wind farms, biomass conversion of
coal power stations, landﬁll gas)5. The UK also considers two other
large-scale low-carbon options (nuclear power, Carbon Capture
and Storage) as key to its electricity transition. These options are
not seen as part of the German low-carbon transition.
The case studies use quantitative energy statistics and qualita-
tive information about motivations, social interactions, events, and
struggles from secondary sources (academic books, articles, com-
mittee reports), complemented with primary sources (government
reports, newspapers). The analysis aims to synthesize these data
into a comprehensive interpretation. The process tracing of event
chains is fairly aggregate, because we cover many developments
over a long period. We  aim to address the ﬁrst two  layers of gran-
ularity, mentioned in Section 2.1, and don’t zoom in to the level of
speciﬁc events, actors or decisions.
Both longitudinal cases are divided into periods: 1990–1998,
1998–2009, 2009–2014 for Germany, and 1990–2002, 2002–2008,
2008–2014 for the UK. This demarcation is roughly based on accel-
eration points in the renewable expansion curves (Fig. 1) and on
major institutional changes. For each period, we discus ‘actors and
institutions’ and ‘actors and technologies’ for the regime and for
renewable niche-innovations that have seen some deployment.
4. The German low-carbon electricity transition
4.1. Nurturing niches in the context of stable and hostile regimes
(1990–1998)
4.1.1. Regime dynamics
4.1.1.1. Actors and institutions. The German electricity market was
constituted as a ‘natural monopoly’, with nine vertically integrated
public utilities providing electricity within demarcated territories
under tight regulatory supervision (Bontrup and Marquardt, 2011).regional and local level.
5 Onshore wind can be implemented as large-scale wind farms (many dozens of
turbines operated by project developers or utilities) or in smaller numbers (1–15
turbines operated by citizens, farmers or cooperatives). The former option is more
prevalent in the UK, and the latter in Germany where 68% of wind parks are smaller
than 10 MW (data from Bundesnetzagentur).
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Fig. 4. Power production from German renewable energy technologies, excluding hydro, in TW h, 1990–2014 (from: http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/EE/Navigation/
DE/Service/Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen/Zeitreihen/zeitreihen.html).
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k/government/collections/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes)16.
.1.1.2. Actors and technologies. Power generation in the 1990s
elied on fossil fuels and nuclear power, complemented with some
ydro-power and oil (Fig. 6).
German hard coal production was traditionally perceived as a
ational asset and received subsidies since the 1960s. Nevertheless,
he number of mines declined from 146 in 1960 to 39 in 1990 to
2 in 2000, and (intended) full closure in 2018. Hard coal for elec-
ricity generation was strongly supported, with subsidies growing
rom 0.4 billion euro in 1975 to more than 4 billion euro in the
arly 1990s (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Cheaper brown coal (lig-
ite) generally remained competitive, although many former East
16 ‘Other biomass’ includes biogas, sewage sludge, and animal biomass. h, 1990–2014 (data from DUKES: Digest of UK Energy Statistics, https://www.gov.
German mines were closed after re-uniﬁcation, which decreased
production from 356.5 million tons in 1990 to 192.7 million tons in
1995 (www.kohlestatistik.de.).
Nuclear power faced substantial opposition from the anti-
nuclear movement, which halted new nuclear construction in the
1980s. The Chernobyl accident (1986) hardened negative pub-
lic attitudes, with opposition parties (Greens, Social Democrats)
favouring closure. But the Conservative-Liberal government, along
with the big utilities, supported nuclear power in the 1990s.4.1.2. Renewable niche-innovations
4.1.2.1. Actors and institutions. Small wind turbines were already
deployed in the late 1980s by farmers, environmentally moti-
vated citizen groups and smaller utilities (Neukirch, 2010). They
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eneﬁtted from positive public perceptions, general interest in
nergy topics, and strong anti-nuclear sentiments (Mautz et al.,
008). Public campaigns led members of Parliament to propose
ET market support laws in 1987, 1988 and 1989 (Byzio et al.,
002). These proposals were opposed by the Economics Ministry
nd rejected by the CDU/FDP government, which generally dis-
iked RETs (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). In 1990, a new proposal
ucceed ‘by accident’ (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016), as the govern-
ent was more concerned with German re-uniﬁcation. It was also
ot expecting the Feed-In-Law to have major effects, anticipating
riginally only a few hundred MW of hydropower (Jacobsson and
auber, 2006). In 1994, even the Minister of Environmental Affairs
Angela Merkel) thought it unlikely that Germany would ever gen-
rate more than 4% renewable electricity (Lauber and Jacobsson,
016).
The 1990 Feed-In-Law obliged utilities to connect RETs to the
rid and to buy renewable electricity at a percentage of the house-
old price of electricity. It also excluded installations in which a
ublic utility held shares of more than 25%. Although the big utili-
ies had little interest in deploying new RETs (which conﬂicted with
heir business models), they did deploy resistance tactics. First, they
ontested the legality of the Feed-In-Law in German courts in 1995
nd with an appeal to the European Court of Justice in 1998 (Tacke,
004). This contestation created regulatory uncertainty, until the
uropean Court ruled against the plaintiffs in 2001. Second, utili-
ies tried to delegitimize renewable electricity, claiming that wind
nergy was expensive and unreliable (Tacke, 2004). Utility pressure
ed to a government proposal in 1997 for a reduction of feed-in
ariffs, which gave rise to a large protest demonstration by envi-
onmental, solar and wind associations, as well as metal workers,
armer groups and church groups. The proposal was  subsequently
ejected in Parliament (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
.1.2.2. Actors and technologies. The Feed-In-Tariff (FiT) made
nshore wind deployment economically feasible (Byzio et al., 2002)
nd stimulated deployment in the 1990s (Fig. 4), often by cit-
zen groups and anti-nuclear activists (Byzio et al., 2002). The
conomic success of German turbine builders (Enercon, Husumer
chiffswerft, Tacke) also expanded the support coalition (Neukirch,
010) and attracted industrial policy support in peripheral regions
f Northern Germany.
Solar-PV remained small, because the FiT was  too low to make
t economically viable. Nevertheless, public views of solar-PV wereicy 45 (2016) 896–913 903
very positive. The government therefore introduced a 1000 PV roof
programme, which attracted much interest and was soon over-
subscribed. Despite installation of 5.3 MW by 1993 (Jacobsson and
Lauber, 2006), policy support was  not extended. Big solar-PV pro-
ducers like Siemens therefore left Germany in the mid-1990s, and
other ﬁrms threatened to follow suit. Green NGOs and industrial
ﬁrms subsequently lobbied for an ecological modernization strat-
egy in which Germany would become a ﬁrst-mover to develop a
solar-PV industry (Fuchs and Wassermann, 2008).
Although the FiT was  too low to create a market for biogas,
ecologically motivated farmers like the ‘Bundschuh-Biogasgruppe’
built their own biogas plants, based on anaerobic waste digestion
(Mautz et al., 2008). They also created the German Biogas Associa-
tion, which lobbied successfully for some FiT-increase in 1998.
4.2. Parallel expansion of regime and niches (1998–2009)
4.2.1. Regime dynamics
4.2.1.1. Actors and institutions. The liberalization of the German
electricity sector in 1998 led utilities to focus on economic
expansion through mergers and acquisitions. Market consolida-
tion resulted in the ‘Big-4′ (RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall, EnBW), which by
2004 generated 90% of all power. The ‘Big-4′ also acquired shares in
regional suppliers and municipal utilities (Bontrup and Marquardt,
2011), but this strategy eventually faced restrictions from antitrust
law. Utilities therefore also expanded at the European and global
level (Kungl, 2015). Stock prices of big German utilities increased
substantially until 2008 (Fig. 7). The formation of a Red-Green gov-
ernment (1998–2005) was a substantial shock for regime actors,
because of radically new policies on nuclear power (phase-out) and
renewables (support).
Liberalization also affected municipal and regional utilities,
which searched for new roles after the 1998 market opening, lead-
ing to diversiﬁcation. Some remained regime actors (focused on
electricity distribution); some were taken over by the big utilities;
others strived for independence, moved into power generation, and
thus became new entrants, often with an RET-orientation (Bontrup
and Marquardt, 2011; Berlo and Wagner, 2013).
4.2.1.2. Actors and technology. The utilities concentrated on large-
scale coal- and gas-ﬁred power plants. By the mid-2000s, they built
many new coal-ﬁred plants (Pahle, 2010). Coal-mining subsidies
declined from 4.45 billion euros in 2000 to 2.5 billion in 2013
(cp. 13 Subventionsbericht der Bundesregierung), but still repre-
sented substantial state support. The 2005 European Emissions
Trading Scheme created some concern about emissions from coal-
ﬁred power in the long run, which stimulated utilities to embark
on (government co-sponsored) R&D programs into carbon capture
and storage.
Nuclear power faced substantial pressure, because the newly
elected Red-Green government introduced the amended Atomic
Energy Law (2002), which speciﬁed a gradual nuclear phase-out
(limiting lifetimes of nuclear plants to 32 years since construction).
When the Red-Green coalition ended in 2005, the utilities lobbied
to reverse this phase-out decision. They intensiﬁed their campaign
when a new center-right government took power (2009), lobby-
ing policymakers and trying to shape public perceptions through
annual reports, newspaper interviews and public relations activi-
ties which emphasized the safety of nuclear power, its low-carbon
credentials, and its contributions to energy security (Kungl, 2015).
4.2.2. Renewable niche-innovations
4.2.2.1. Actors and institutions. In 2000, the Red-Green govern-
ment published a climate protection programme that aimed for
25% CO2-reduction by 2005, compared to 1990, and 10% renew-
able electricity in 2010. In 2002, the renewable electricity target
904 F.W. Geels et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 896–913
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as increased to 12.5% by 2010 and 60% in 2050 (Jacobsson and
auber, 2006). To achieve these targets, the government introduced
he Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), which obliged grid
perators to connect RET-facilities with priority, guaranteed con-
istent minimum payment for renewable electricity for 20 years,
nd adjusted ﬁnancial support levels to the maturity of differ-
nt technologies. The EEG was supported by a broad advocacy
oalition, which included environmentally-oriented organisations
Eurosolar, Förderverein Solarenergie, Greenpeace, PV-companies),
s well as organisations from metal and machine-building sectors
Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
Another important rule change was the transfer, in 2002, of
esponsibility for renewable energy from the Ministry of Economic
ffairs, which had negative orientations towards RETs, towards the
inistry for Environmental Affairs.
The EEG protected renewable electricity and stimulated sub-
tantial expansion (Fig. 1), which created economic pressure on
tilities. Utilities tried to discredit the EEG by criticizing regulations
hat in their opinion derailed market mechanisms and raised costs.
.ON’s CEO, for instance, stated that: “There is no use for us being a
ioneer in climate protection if we thereby weaken our position in
nternational competition. 300 jobs disappear every day. We  cannot
fford eco-policy at any price” (WirtschaftsWoche, May  6, 2004).
In subsequent years, the EEG evolved through larger changes (in
004, 2009) and minor amendments (see Hoppmann et al., 2014,
or an excellent description). To accommodate industry complaints,
EG-adjustments increasingly exempted commercial actors from
aying the EEG-surcharge, which meant that households carried
ore of the ﬁnancial burden. The increasing consumer energy bills
ubsequently became an important argument of EEG-opponents
‘Big-4′, Ministry of Economic Affairs), leading to cost-reduction
ttempts from 2008 onwards (Hoppmann et al., 2014). Public sup-
ort for renewables remained high, however, and RETs developed
nto a signiﬁcant industrial activity, which increased industrial pol-
cy interest at state and local levels..2.2.2. Actors and technologies. The renewables expansion coin-
ided with a ‘social opening up’ of the electricity sector (Mautz et al.,
008), resulting from increasing numbers of new entrants and theurt stock exchange www.ﬁnanzen.net, accessed on February 3, 2014).
creation of new associations that helped professionalize the renew-
ables sector. Incumbent utilities continued to play a limited role in
RETs. Most renewables growth came from four RETs:
• Onshore wind continued its expansion (Fig. 4), with more actors
deploying wind turbines for economic reasons. As the wind sector
professionalized, the heterogeneity of actors decreased.
• The expansion in biogenic solid fuel was  initially driven by
municipal utilities (trend:research, 2011), which built on their
experience with medium-sized infrastructure. Some municipal
utilities joined forces to develop countervailing power against
the Big-4, leading to larger coalitions that jointly operated plants
and exerted political inﬂuence (Bontrup and Marquardt, 2011).
• Biogas expanded rapidly after 2006 (Fig. 4), with most new
farmers being motivated by economic considerations such as
attractive ﬁnancial incentives in the EEG-2004 and low agri-
cultural prices, which stimulated diversiﬁcation. Professional
associations (Fachverband Biogas) additionally provided techni-
cal and procedural support (Mautz et al., 2008).
• Solar-PV deployment was stimulated by the federal 100.000-roof
program, introduced in 1999, and by EEG-support. Rapid diffu-
sion after 2006 (Fig. 4) was carried by different actors. Small-scale
solar-PV systems were deployed by citizens; large-scale roof-
and ﬁeld-mounted systems were mainly deployed by farmers;
centralized PV power systems were mainly deployed by project
developers (Dewald and Truffer, 2011). Solar-PV developed into
an industrial success story, as total sales of the German PV indus-
try grew from 201 million euro in 2000 to 7 billion euro in 2008.
Export sales grew from 273 million euro in 2004 to approximately
5 billion euro in 2010 (BSW-Solar, 2010).
4.3. The niche-regime ‘battle’ intensiﬁes (2009–2014)
4.3.1. Regime dynamics
4.3.1.1. Actors and institutions. The newly elected (2009) center-
right government (CDU/CSU/FDP) overturned the previous nuclear
phase-out decision in 2010. This decision was  welcomed by the
utilities, but triggered heated public debates and large anti-nuclear
protests. In 2010, the government published an ambitious ‘Energy
F.W. Geels et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 896–913 905
Table  2
German ownership structure (%) of installed capacity of different renewable electricity technologies in 2010 (from: trend:research, 2011).
Households Farmers Banks, funds Project developers Municipal utilities Industry Four major utilities Others
Wind 51.5 1.8 15.5 21.3 3.4 2.3 2.1 2.2
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PV  39.3 21.2 8.1 8.3 
oncept’, which the opposition claimed was meant to appease pub-
ic opinion. The energy concept proposed that renewable electricity
eneration would increase to 35% in 2020, 40–45% by 2025, 55–60%
y 2035 and 80% by 2050 (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016). In 2011,
he Fukushima nuclear accident caused major public uproar, in
esponse to which the government immediately closed eight of
eventeen nuclear plants, with the remainder being phased out in a
taged process between 2015 and 2022. The nuclear phase-out also
ave rise to the Energiewende,  an explicit energy transition policy
hat formally adopted the renewable electricity targets from the
Energy Concept’.
Meanwhile, the utilities faced serious economic problems
ecause of several developments (Kungl, 2015): (1) the ﬁnancial-
conomic crisis reduced electricity demand, which caused
ver-supply, (2) renewable electricity expansion reduced the mar-
et share of incumbent utilities, (3) renewable electricity expansion
educed the electricity wholesale price due to the merit order
ffect6, leading to gas displacement, (4) the closure of nuclear reac-
ors left utilities with stranded assets. These economic problems
aused utility share prices to drop by 60–70% between 2008 and
013 (Fig. 7) and led utilities to question their business models. The
EO of EnBW stated in its 2012 annual report: “I see a paradigm shift
n the energy sector that questions the traditional business model of
any power supply companies.” A conﬁdential paper titled ‘RWE’s
orporate Story’ raised gloomy prospects: “The massive erosion of
he wholesale prices caused by the growth of German photovoltaics
onstitutes a serious problem for RWE  which may  even threaten the
ompany’s survival” (Energy Post, October 21, 2013).
These problems also worried the government, which therefore
ttempted to slow down renewables expansion (see below), while
trengthening support for utilities and conventional power plants.
he latter were increasingly framed as complementary to RETs and
s necessary (in the short to medium-term) for guaranteeing the
tability of the electricity system. Attention turned to new policies
ike ‘capacity markets’, which would reward utilities for providing
he availability rather than use of generating capacity (Wassermann
t al., 2015).
.3.1.2. Actors and technology. Nuclear power steeply declined
fter 2011, with the resulting gap being ﬁlled by expanding
enewable electricity and increased use of domestic lignite and
nternational hard coal (Fig. 6). Combined with down-scaled gas
se, German CO2-emissions from power-generation increased
rom 304 Mt  CO2 in 2011 to 317 Mt  CO2 in 20137. Local protests and
olitical uncertainties led utilities (RWE, Vattenfall) to cancel their
lans for Carbon Capture and Storage (Pietzner and Schumann,
012).
The utilities belatedly diversiﬁed into renewable energy pro-
uction: RWE  founded RWE  Innogy (2007), Vattenfall created
6 The merit order refers to the ranking of sources of electricity generation, in
scending order of short-run marginal production costs. Electricity sources with
he  lowest marginal costs (renewable electricity) are ﬁrst brought online to meet
emand.
7 Based on statistics from the Federal Environmental Agency; http://www.
mweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/ﬁles/medien/376/publikationen/climate
hange 23 2014 komplett.pdf.3.1 0.1 0.1 5.7
24.3 41.5 9.6 12.7
2.6 19.2 0.2 1.1
Vattenfall Europe New Energy (2007) and a Wind sub-division
(2009), E.ON founded E.ON Climate and Renewables (2008) and
EnBW launched EnBW Renewables (2008). These renewable energy
activities mainly happened in foreign markets (e.g. UK offshore
wind), so involvement in Germany remained small, with only 6.5%
of renewable electricity being produced by the Big-4 in 2010, which
mainly comprised of hydro-power, biomass and some offshore
wind (trend:research, 2011).
4.3.2. Renewable niche innovations
4.3.2.1. Actors and technology. Renewable electricity expansion
was accompanied by social broadening of RET-deployment. Munic-
ipal utilities became an important actor (especially in biomass),
with the number of newly founded municipal utilities rising from
23 between 2005 and 2008 to 59 between 2009 and 2012 (Berlo
and Wagner, 2013). Citizen energy cooperatives also expanded
rapidly. In 2012, 754 energy cooperatives were listed in cooper-
ative registries, with 199 created in 2012 alone (Holstenkamp and
Müller, 2013). Farmers also increasingly engaged with RETs for
commercial reasons, both in biogas and large-scale solar-PV. Table 2
demonstrates the broad social base, represented in terms of relative
ownership.
Renewables growth mainly came from three RETs:
• Onshore wind continued to expand (Fig. 4), operated by utilities,
cooperatives, and investors.
• Biogas continued to grow, as EEG-support attracted mainstream
farmers. The German Farmers’ Association and the German Bio-
gas Association facilitated diffusion by offering legal and technical
advice with regard to market and system integration (Hahn et al.,
2014). The 2012 and 2014 EEG-amendments slowed growth,
however, because of new technical prescriptions and reduced
ﬁnancial support (German Biogas Association, 2014; Agentur für
Erneuerbare Energien 2015).
• Solar-PV showed faster-than-expected growth (from 6.6 TW h
electricity in 2009 to to 34.9 TW h in 2014), because of high citizen
interest, EEG-support, and decreasing PV-module prices, result-
ing from Chinese mass production, over-production and price
dumping (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016). Cheap Chinese imports
created economic problems for German manufacturers of PV-
modules8, which led to critical debates (about EEG subsidizing
Chinese manufacturers). The substantial 2012 EEG-adjustments
slowed the growth in solar-PV deployment rate (Fig. 4). The 2014
EEG-amendment further slowed expansion, with the rate of new
installations falling behind the government’s expansion plans in
the ﬁrst half of 20159.
• The government also tried to stimulate offshore wind, which ﬁt-
ted incumbent utilities because of size and cost structures. In
2010, the government increased the EEG remuneration rate and
set ambitious expansion targets (10 GW by 2020). Offshore wind
deployment remained relatively small, however, with only eight
offshore wind parks in operation by the end of 2014 (916 MW
8 German producers of inverters, manufacturing equipment and poly-silicon pro-
duction fared somewhat better (Hoppmann et al., 2014).
9 See: http://www.iwr.de/news.php?id=29163.
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5.1.1.2. Actors and technology. In the 1990s, utilities switched from
coal to natural gas (Fig. 9). This ‘dash for gas’ was  stimulated by
various factors (Pearson and Watson, 2012): utility preferences forFig. 8. EEG surcharge for private households (ct/kW h) (BDEW, 2014).
installed capacity) and eleven more under construction. Reasons
for the slow development were problems with grid access and
technical challenges of deep water construction, which drove up
costs (Reichardt et al., 2015). In the 2014 EEG adjustments, the
government downscaled support for offshore wind.
.3.2.2. Actors and institutions. The renewables support coalitions
eakened in this period (Lauber and Jacobsson, 2016), because
erman RET-industries faced problems due to Chinese competi-
ion. RETs also faced operational and cost challenges, which led
o struggles and rule adjustments. First, EEG-surcharges increased
apidly since 2009 (Fig. 8), with half of the EEG surcharge being
sed to support solar-PV (Hoppmann et al., 2014). The rise in con-
umer electricity prices led to critical debates about renewables,
ith utilities highlighting threats to the economy and undesirable
mpacts on poor households. These arguments resonated with the
DU/FDP government, which made various adjustments in the EEG
Hoppmann et al., 2014). The substantial 2012 amendments low-
red EEG-support, which created uncertainty amongst investors in
olar-PV and wind (Stegen and Seel, 2013).
Second, increasing amounts of intermittent RETs (wind, solar)
reated concerns about ‘system integration’ and grid stability.
ncumbent utilities reinforced these fears, warning for black-
ut risks10. To address system integration, research activities
egan focusing on demand side management and energy storage
BMWi/BMU/BMBF, 2011). It remained challenging, however, to
evelop business models for commercially viable energy storage
nd policies that would attract investments (BDEW, 2013).
Third, intermittent RETs created ‘market integration’ problems,
ecause their operational characteristics disrupted ‘normal’ mar-
et functioning (for instance negative prices on sunny, windy
ays when renewables produced more power than consumers
emanded). To facilitate market integration of RETs, the govern-
ent introduced new policies to stimulate direct marketing of
enewable electricity11, e.g. an ‘optional market premium’ and a
ﬂexibility premium’ mechanism (Wassermann et al., 2015).
10 RWE’s CEO, for instance, warned that renewables could lead to black-outs, stat-
ng that he was  “really worried” because “everywhere with high speed more plants
ill be taken from the grid”. E.ON further warned for a “wave of decommissioning”
nd “hazards for electricity supply” (Spiegel, October 29, 2013, own translation).
11 Direct marketing transfers the task of selling renewable electricity from the
ransmission system operator to renewable plant operators.licy 45 (2016) 896–913
The various rule changes aimed to slow renewables expansion
and make RETs more compatibile with the existing electricity sys-
tem (through system and market integration). It proved difﬁcult,
however, to contain the renewables ‘genie’ once it was  out of the
bottle (Fig. 1). In 2014, the government therefore made further
changes. It transferred EEG-responsibility back to the Economics
Ministry and substantially amended the EEG, setting upper limits
for RET-expansion. To ‘manage’ renewables expansion, the govern-
ment also signiﬁcantly lowered EEG-remunerations, said it would
end bioenergy subsidies, articulated upper limits for offshore wind
expansion, and stated intentions to introduce auction systems.
These policy changes disadvantage many new entrants and favour
larger actors skilled in handling auctions, marketing, and network
management.
Having analysed the German low-carbon transition along our
conceptual categories, we now turn to the UK case. Section 6 then
makes a comparative analysis of both countries in relation to the
two conceptual contributions.
5. The UK low-carbon electricity transition
5.1. Slow RET-developments in privatised regime context
(1990–2002)
5.1.1. Regime dynamics
5.1.1.1. Actors and institutions. The UK electricity industry was  pri-
vatised (1990) and liberalized (1998), which eventually resulted
in the ‘Big Six’ electricity companies (EDF, E.ON, SSE, British Gas,
Scottish Power, N-Power). Their guiding principles came to focus
on price competition, sweating assets and fuel ﬂexibility (Pearson
and Watson, 2012).
The government increasingly adopted a hands-off approach,
leaving decisions to the market. The Department of Energy was
therefore disbanded in 1992, relegating energy policy to a sub-
division of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). To
depoliticize energy governance, DTI set the regulatory framework,
but left implementation to the newly created independent regula-
tor Ofgem. Ofgem’s main remit was  to ensure that markets were
sufﬁciently competitive and to protect consumer interests (Kern et
al., 2014b).Fig. 9. UK electricity generation by fuel type, 1990–2014, in TW h (data from
DUKES).
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advisers increasingly framed nuclear power as a solution for cli-
mate change and energy security (Verhees, 2012). The 2007 White
Paper broadened government support from renewables to include
nuclear power and coal with CCS. Greenpeace legally contested thisF.W. Geels et al. / Resear
ower generation units with short lead times, low capital costs,
nd quick returns on investment, which aligned well with com-
ined cycle gas turbines (CCGT); price/performance improvements
n CCGT; new North sea gas ﬁnds and cheap international gas; envi-
onmental beneﬁts of gas compared to coal.
Coal-ﬁred power generation was perceived to be on its way
ut in the 1990s (Turnheim, 2012), because of the ‘dash for
as’, pressures from the European Large Combustion Plants Direc-
ive (LCPD), which prescribed reductions in SO2 emissions, and
ressures from climate change.
Nuclear power also faced difﬁculties when preparation for
rivatization revealed its poor economic performance. Scandals
onnected with the storage of nuclear waste (Sellaﬁeld) and repro-
essing further undermined its legitimacy (Verhees, 2012). In 1989,
he government withdrew nuclear power plants from privatisa-
ion plans and announced a moratorium on new nuclear plants.
n 1990, the government introduced the Non-Fossil Fuels Obliga-
ion (NFFO), which required electricity companies to buy certain
mounts of nuclear power for which they were compensated with
 subsidy paid from a Fossil Fuel Levy. In 1996, the government sold
he nuclear plants to British Energy, which had to be bailed out in
002 when declining electricity prices created ﬁnancial problems
Hewlett, 2005)12.
.1.2. Renewable niche-innovations
.1.2.1. Actors and institutions. Support for RETs emerged as a ‘side-
ffect’ (Toke and Lauber, 2007) of the NFFO, when renewables’
dvocates argued that RETs should also qualify for non-fossil fuel
ubsidies. The government obliged, although it had no clear renew-
bles strategy (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). The NFFO policy for
enewables, which was intended to run from 1990 to 1998, was a
ompetitive auction system in ﬁve different rounds. Bidders could
ubmit proposals to produce a certain amount of renewable elec-
ricity for a certain price. In each round, the government awarded
ontracts to the lowest bidders (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). The
FFO-bidding process was complicated, requiring sophisticated
nancial capabilities and sufﬁcient capital to cope with the eco-
omic risks and policy uncertainties. These characteristics favoured
rofessional corporate actors and discriminated against smaller
ew entrants with less-developed procedural and ﬁnancial capa-
ilities and resources (Toke, 2005; Mitchell and Connor, 2004).
The NFFO was limitedly effective because many accepted bids
ever resulted in actual RET-deployment. This was  due to the auc-
ion design, which stimulated bidders to submit very low cost
roposals that were later found to be too uneconomical to be
ealised (Toke and Lauber, 2007). The completion rate of NFFO-
rojects decreased over time. Over the whole period (1990–2004),
nly 30% were actually completed (Wood and Dow, 2011).
.1.2.2. Actors and technology. The NFFO produced slow growth
f renewable electricity (from 1.9% in 1990 to 3.0% in 2002),
ainly from landﬁll gas, onshore wind and energy-from-waste
Fig. 5), which received continuous subsidy support over suc-
essive NFFO-rounds. These RETs, which were operated by large
orporate actors (utilities, project developers, landﬁll site opera-
ors, waste companies), were also closest to market, which ﬁtted
he policy’s short-term orientation and low-cost emphasis. Other
ETs (e.g. energy crops, sewage gas) received intermittent sup-
ort, which hampered investor conﬁdence (Mitchell and Connor,
004). RET-development by new entrants (cooperatives, farmers,
ocal communities) remained limited. In 2004, only 1.5% of wind
urbine capacity was owned by farmers and cooperatives, while
12 The government also took responsibility for nuclear waste management and
ecommissioning costs of around £3 billion (Hewlett, 2005).icy 45 (2016) 896–913 907
98% was  operated by utilities and corporate independents (Toke,
2005).
Further problems occurred with regard to grid connection
(which utilities made difﬁcult for new entrants) and local imple-
mentation (because utilities and project developers engaged in
poor consultation processes which gave rise to public opposi-
tion) (Wood and Dow, 2011). Local planning problems were partly
related to the NFFO’s bidding design: most developers did not start
the planning permission process until after they were awarded the
contract. They would then be in a hurry and install RETs without
proper stakeholder consultation, which turned many stakeholders
into opponents (Ellis et al.,  2009). For onshore wind, this resulted in
negative sentiments and perceptions of unfair distributions of costs
(local stakeholders experiencing noise, visual burdens, shadow
ﬂicker) and beneﬁts (project developers enjoying wind resources
and ﬁnancial gains).
5.2. Rising energy concerns in a neo-liberal context (2002–2008)
5.2.1. Regime dynamics
5.2.1.1. Actors and institutions. The Labour government, elected in
1997, made climate change an important issue for energy policy.
The 2003 White Paper Our Energy Future: Creating a Low-Carbon
Economy highlighted the need for a 60% reduction of GHG emissions
by 2050 and committed to a target of 10% renewable electricity by
2010. It saw carbon pricing (via European emissions trading) as the
main instrument.
Public attention to climate change increased rapidly in the mid-
2000s, making it an attractive issue for high-level politicians to
compete on (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). This competition resulted
in cross-party consensus about the importance of climate change.
Rising oil and gas prices (Fig. 10) and the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute
in 2005 made costs and energy security important goals besides cli-
mate change in the 2007 White Paper Meeting The Energy Challenge
(Kern et al., 2014b).
5.2.1.2. Actors and technologies. The 2003 White Paper was  a blow
for nuclear power,  because it stated that: “Its current economics
make nuclear power an unattractive option for new, carbon-free
generating capacity and there are also important issues of nuclear
waste to be resolved” (p. 12). The White Paper further promised
that new construction decisions would require “the fullest pub-
lic consultation”. In subsequent years, however, policymakers andFig. 10. Average fuel prices (pence per kWh) paid by UK  power producers (quarterly
energy prices from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/./qep mar
2013.pdf http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Statistics/publications/prices/1085-
qepdec10.pdf, accessed on July 22, 2013).
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evival of nuclear power, arguing that the government had failed
o properly consult (Verhees, 2012). The court agreed and ordered
he government to launch a new consultation. Prime Minister Blair,
owever, announced in advance that “This won’t affect policy at
ll”.
Coal-ﬁred power plants faced pressure from climate change
oncerns and LCPD emission targets, which implied that most exist-
ng plants should close by 2015 (or had to heavily invest in ﬂue
as desulphurisation). Rising gas prices, however, led utilities to
urn more coal in existing plants between 2000 and 2006 (Fig. 9).
oncerns about energy security also led the government to recon-
ider coal, with the trade and industry secretary stating: “If a new,
leaner coal generation is viable, then I think it could have an impor-
ant part to play in making sure we have diverse generation in the
uture. Coal is easy to store and it comes from a variety of well-
stablished sources around the world” (reported in The Guardian, 21
ebruary 2006). These reconsiderations were legitimated with the
romise of ‘clean coal’, based on ﬂue gas desulfurization, supercriti-
al pulverised coal technologies, coal gasiﬁcation and CCS. The 2007
hite Paper announced £1 billion subsidy for a CCS demonstration
rogramme (Turnheim, 2012).
.2.2. Renewable niche-innovations
.2.2.1. Actors and institutions. While emissions-trading was the
ain climate policy instrument, the government also introduced
he Renewables Obligation (RO) in 2002, which required utilities
o meet annual renewable electricity targets, which increased to
0% in 2010. Utilities could meet these targets in several ways:
a) generate renewable electricity themselves, (b) buy Renewable
bligation Certiﬁcates (ROCs) from other generators, (c) pay a ‘buy-
ut’ penalty of 3p/kW h.
The RO was more market-oriented than the NFFO, because it
as based on free-market trading of ROCs and abolished the NFFO’s
echnology banding. Because all RETs received the same number of
OCs, the RO was biased towards cheaper (large-scale) technolo-
ies such as onshore wind and landﬁll gas. Small-scale producers
nd independents raised concerns about this discrimination and
roposed ‘bands’ for different RETs. DTI-ofﬁcials rejected these pro-
osals, arguing that governments should ‘not pick winners’ but
eave technology choices to the market (Foxon and Pearson, 2007).
Although renewable electricity grew from 3.0% in 2002 to 5.8% in
008, renewables policy had several ﬂaws, including incentives for
tilities to underperform (Toke, 2005), uncertainties over longer-
erm policy commitment (Wood and Dow, 2011), and neglect of
nnovation (Foxon and Pearson, 2007). The RO also favoured incum-
ents and discriminated against new entrants (Woodman and
itchell, 2011), because ROC-trading created ﬁnancial uncertain-
ies (about future ROC prices and viability of investments), which
ere easier to manage for utilities with deep pockets.
.2.2.2. Actors and technologies. Renewable electricity mainly came
rom four RETs (Fig. 5).
Co-ﬁring of biomass in coal plants grew rapidly after 2002,
because it was relatively easy and cheap for utilities.
Landﬁll gas, which was deployed by landﬁll operators using
mature technologies, slowed in the mid-2000s, because succes-
sive waste policies (landﬁll tax, EU Landﬁll Directive) reduced the
amount of organic waste going to landﬁll.
Energy-from-waste increased slowly because many projects
encountered local permit problems.
Onshore wind farms, operated primarily by utilities and project
developers (Toke, 2005), accelerated after 2002 because the RO
provided attractive ﬁnancial support (Foxon and Pearson, 2007).
However, many proposed wind projects encountered local
opposition, because project developers paid limited attentionlicy 45 (2016) 896–913
to stakeholder concerns (Ellis et al., 2009). Consequently, the
public discourse about wind became increasingly negative.
Offshore wind, which is much more expensive than onshore
wind, started tentatively in 2001 with a demonstration project in
Blyth. Five other offshore wind farms, aimed at further learning,
were constructed between 2003 and 2007, supported by capital
grants (Kern et al., 2014a).
5.3. Increasing renewables momentum in more difﬁcult
socio-political contexts (2008–2014)
5.3.1. Regime dynamics
5.3.1.1. Actors and institutions. This period started with strong cli-
mate change commitments. In 2007, the government accepted the
European 20-20-20 targets, which included a 20% share of renew-
ables in energy consumption by 2020. In 2008, the government
introduced the Climate Change Act which was a radical policy
change (Carter and Jacobs, 2014) that legally committed the UK
to 80% GHG reduction by 2050 and 34% reduction by 2020. In 2008,
the government also created the Department of Energy and Cli-
mate Change (DECC) and the independent Committee on Climate
Change (CCC), with responsibilities for advising the government
about progress towards climate change targets.
The translation of high-level goals into more speciﬁc targets and
plans created a policy delivery momentum. For the electricity sec-
tor, the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009) articulated a target of
30% renewable electricity by 2020 and an almost complete decar-
bonisation by 2030. Other implementation-oriented documents
were the amended Renewables Obligation (2009), the UK Renew-
able Energy Strategy (2009), the Carbon Plan (2011), the Energy
Bill (2012) and the Electricity Market Reform (2013). The various
policies represented a move from a hands-off approach to higher
degrees of interventionism (Lockwood, 2013; Kern et al., 2014b).
While policy momentum increased, the transition also faced
political counter-trends, which gathered pace after the ﬁnancial-
economic crisis and the election of a new Conservative-Liberal
Democrat government in 2010. First, public attention to climate
change diminished, leading politicians to realize that they were
ahead of their voters (Lockwood, 2013). Especially the right-wing
of the Conservative party became more vocal, criticizing subsidies
for onshore wind and questioning climate change science. Second,
the ﬁnancial-economic crisis enhanced concerns about jobs, com-
petitiveness and energy prices. The Treasury used these concerns
to regain inﬂuence over climate policy (Carter and Jacobs, 2014),
issuing warnings that green policies should not hinder the econ-
omy. In 2013, cost concerns escalated into a full-scale political row
over rising energy bills, which led the government to scrap, delay or
water down various green policies. Third, the government refused
to commit to long-term renewable electricity targets beyond 2020,
despite repeated recommendations from the Committee on Cli-
mate Change.
5.3.1.2. Actors and technology. The 2008 White Paper on Nuclear
Energy announced plans to construct eight new nuclear power
reactors by 2025 (Verhees, 2012). Public opposition was limited,
partly because the environmental movement was  divided, with
some activists (e.g. Stephen Tindale, George Monbiot, Mark Lynas)
perceiving nuclear power as a necessary evil to address climate
change. Private companies showed lukewarm interest because
waste processing liabilities, decommissioning costs, and unclear
future electricity prices created uncertainties about the viability of
nuclear investments, especially since the government had repeat-
edly ruled out subsidies. In 2013, the energy company Centrica
abandoned new construction plans, leaving only EDF in negotia-
tions with the UK government about a 3.2 GW plant at Hinkley
Point. To enable the deal, the government broke its non-subsidy
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ledge, agreeing to pay EDF a guaranteed price (£92.50 per MW h,
wice the wholesale price) for 35 years. To enable future con-
truction, the new Contracts-for-Difference (see below) offered
ttractive incentives for nuclear power (Toke, 2013). At the time
f writing, the nuclear programme is already 5 years behind sched-
le, compared to the 2008 ambitions, making it unlikely that the
overnment will reach its stated aims for 2025.
The government also strengthened its commitment to natural
as, inspired by the US shale gas revolution. In 2012, the gov-
rnment lifted restrictions on fracking. In 2013, the Chancellor
romised tax breaks for shale gas companies, arguing that shale
as “has the potential to create thousands of jobs and keep energy
ills low for millions of people.” In 2013, the government also
xpressed desires for building forty gas-ﬁred power stations, which
he Committee on Climate Change warned would be incompatible
ith climate change targets. Despite heated local protests against
racking, the government decided to move ahead, with the Prime
inister personally expressing strong commitment in a letter to The
elegraph, dismissing protesters as uninformed NIMBY-activists
11 August 2013).
By 2008, utilities were seeking approval for new coal-ﬁred
ower plants, totalling over 11 GW,  to replace plants that would
e phased out by 2015/16 (Turnheim, 2012). These plans would
hreaten climate change ambitions and triggered public opposi-
ion from activist groups like Climate Camp, which campaigned
gainst a new plant at Kingsnorth. In 2009, DECC announced
hat no new coal-ﬁred plants would be permitted unless they
ncorporated Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Although the
overnment’s £1 billion subsidy for CCS demonstration projects
riggered some interest from energy companies, no projects mate-
ialized. Meanwhile, coal use in exising plants increased, especially
n 2012 when coal use increased by 32% in one year (from 103.1
o 135.9 TW h). Coal use decreased substantially in 2013 and
014 (Fig. 9), as some coal-ﬁred plants were (partially) converted
o biomass (Drax, Ironbridge) or closed (Kingsnorth, Cockenzie,
ilbury Didcot, Uskmouth, Ferrybridge) because of LCPD-legislation
nd end-of-life considerations.
.3.2. Renewable niche-innovations
.3.2.1. Actors and institutions. The political salience of climate
hange increased criticism of the limited effectiveness of the
enewables Obligation, which resulted in an amended Renewables
bligation (2009) that included technology banding, which allo-
ated varying amounts of ROCs to different technologies, depending
n degree of maturity and level of risk. In 2010, the government
eluctantly introduced a Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) as part of a political
eal with backbenchers, who wanted a stimulus for small-scale
enewables in exchange for their support for nuclear and offshore
ind (Smith et al., 2013). In 2011, the Treasury established the
evy Control Framework (LCF), which enabled it to control ﬁnan-
ial spending by DECC on levy-funded schemes such as the RO, FiT
nd Contracts-for-Difference (CfD). The Electricity Market Reform
rocess provided attractive incentives for large-scale renewables
nd nuclear power through CfDs (from 2017 onwards). The 2013
olar PV Strategy and 2014 Community Energy Strategy also paid
ome attention to small-scale renewables.
.3.2.2. Actors and technologies. The rapid expansion of renewable
lectricity mainly came from three RETs (Fig. 5).Onshore wind continued to expand, with some increase in com-
munity energy since the mid-2000s13. The public discourse about
13 Strachan et al. (2015: 105), however, conclude that “community renewables
emain weakly developed in the UK”, partly because of limited organizationalicy 45 (2016) 896–913 909
wind became increasingly negative, because of concerns about
subsidies, visual/landscape impacts, and the perceived invasion
of the countryside by corporate interests (Kern et al., 2014a).
These concerns gave rise to opposition from the Campaign to Pro-
tect Rural England and Conservative MPs, one hundred of whom
wrote an open letter to the Prime Minister arguing against wind
subsidies (5 February 2012). Local opposition against wind-farm
proposals decreased approval rates in planning procedures from
73% in 2007 to 50% in 2012 (Committee on Climate Change, 2013).
• The deployment of offshore wind (OSW) accelerated with the
amended RO, which provided attractive support (Hepstonstall
et al., 2012). Annual installed capacity grew rapidly from 0.2 GW
in 2008 to 1.2 GW in 2012, 0.7 GW in 2013 and 0.8 GW in 2014,
making the UK the world leader in OSW-deployment. Kern et al.
(2014a) suggest that OSW, which is one of the most expensive
RETs, was pushed by a powerful coalition of actors, including
DECC, BIS, the Crown Estate and utilities.
• Deployment of biogenic solid fuel accelerated rapidly after the
UK Bioenergy Strategy (DECC, 2012), which shifted emphasis from
relatively small-scale (<50 MW)  dedicated biomass plants, oper-
ated by new entrants (e.g. sawmills, poulty farms), towards the
conversion of coal plants into biomass-burning plants. These con-
verted plants are large-scale facilities (e.g. Tilbury 750 MW,  Drax,
1980 MW,  Ironbridge 1000 MW),  which require some technical
adjustments, but enable coal plant operators to extend the plant’s
lifetime. This new strategy triggered a public controversy about
the sustainability of industrial-scale ‘Big Biomass’. Environmental
organizations criticized the government in a 2012 report (Dirtier
than Coal?), arguing that imported bio-crops have indirect land-
use, bio-diversity and carbon impacts. In 2013, the opening of the
(partly) converted Drax-plant triggered protest marches and led
Friends of the Earth to question the legality of government aid
to Drax (£75 million loan guarantees) with the European Com-
mission. In 2014, the government admitted that it had made a
mistake in calculating carbon savings from large-scale biomass
(DECC, 2014), and said that policies would be adjusted.
The deployment of solar-PV greatly accelerated since the 2010
FiT. Although still relatively small, power generation almost dou-
bled between 2013 and 2014 to 4.1 TW h (Fig. 5). Growth was fastest
in the small-scale segment for domestic rooftops (<4 kW), although
large utility-scale solar farms (>5 MW)  also grew rapidly, which
raised concerns about the effects on renewable subsidies and social
acceptance.
In sum, large-scale RETs diffused rapidly in this period, sup-
ported by coalitions of large corporate actors and policymakers.
Onshore wind and Big Biomass, however, encountered resistance
from civil society actors, environmental NGOs, and local citizens.
6. Discussion
6.1. Endogenously enacted transition pathways in context
The German and UK electricity transitions, analysed above,
clearly differ substantially in terms of enactment and the kinds
of transition pathways pursued. This section aims to demonstrate
the fruitfulness of the reformulated transition pathways, using the
analytical categories to interpret and explain these differences.followed a substitution pathway (‘unleashing new entrants’). In
terms of technologies, small-scale RETs (solar-PV, biogas, small
capacities, and partly because of “the persistence of key features of socio-technical
regime for electricity provision, which continues to favour large corporations and
major facilities” (p 106).
9 ch Po
o
t
c
t
w
e
f
s
o
S
t
R
T
s
s
w
u
m
c
i
f
e
c
l
S
o
t
w
e
R
b
b
m
t
a
c
e
•
•
•
•
a10 F.W. Geels et al. / Resear
nshore wind) competed with regime technologies from which
hey deviated in terms of knowledge base and operational prin-
iples (decentralized)14. This pattern is explained by the other
wo categories (actors and institutions). German RET-deployment
as enacted by radically new entrants (citizens, cooperatives,
nvironmental activists, farmers, municipal utilities), who pre-
erred small-scale RETs and, in the ﬁrst period, were inspired by
ocial, environmental and anti-nuclear motivations. In the sec-
nd and third period, ﬁnancial motivations gained importance.
upport coalitions for RET-deployment also included indus-
rial associations from the metal and machine-building sector,
ET-manufacturers, and policymakers interested in green jobs.
he 1990 Feed-in-Law offered protection for new entrants and
mall-scale RET-deployment (mainly wind), while the 2000 EEG
timulated wider RET-diffusion, thereby ‘unleashing’ new entrants.
In contrast, we argue that the UK followed a transformation path-
ay, in which RET-deployment was mainly enacted by incumbent
tilities, professional project developers and other corporate actors,
otivated primarily by commercial motivations and regulatory
ompliance. Renewable electricity policies focused on incentivizing
ncumbents to deploy RETs rather than enabling new entrants. In
act, various auction and trading schemes created barriers for new
ntrants. RET policy instruments were also less stable and more
omplicated than in Germany, which favoured incumbents with
arger balance sheets. The 2010 Feed-In-Tariff, the 2013 Solar PV
trategy and the 2014 Community Energy Strategy are recent add-
n policies, aimed at small-scale RETs which complement rather
han disrupt the focus on large-scale options (nuclear, offshore
ind, CCS). These two categories (actors and institutions) help
xplain why renewable electricity mainly comes from large-scale
ETs (offshore wind, onshore wind, conversion of coal plants to
iomass, landﬁll gas), which required new technical knowledge,
ut ﬁtted with centralized operational principles and business
odels of incumbents.
The enactment of these different transition pathways is fur-
her explained by static landscape characteristics that shaped
ction possibilities. Several societal deep-structures in Germany
reated positive affordance structures for RET-deployment by new
ntrants:
Germany has a relatively strong and organized civil society with
active cooperatives, citizen groups, activists, and socially engaged
scientists.
Germany’s ‘coordinated market economy’ (Hall and Soskice,
2001) has a collaborative tradition for stakeholder interaction,
which in various instances led the government to accommo-
date civil society pressure (e.g. protests in the late 1990s against
proposed cancellation of the Feed-In-Law; demands for more
RET-support in the 2000s; protests against nuclear power and
shale gas in the early 2010s). The ‘coordinated market economy’
also usually implies close interactions between utility incum-
bents and the government, which were, however, disrupted by
the Red-Green government, as we discuss below.
Germany has a strong environmentalist tradition (Dryzek et al.,
2002), which helps explain the cultural resonance of the renew-
able energy discourse and the presence of a Green Party in
Parliament, which became part of the government from 1998 to
2005.
The German economy has substantial manufacturing sectors,
which meant that German ﬁrms could beneﬁt economically
from the electricity transition, building wind turbines, solar-
PV modules and other RETs. The creation of jobs and new
14 Recent offshore wind efforts create some deviation from this pattern, as they
re  large-scale and mainly enacted by incumbent utilities.licy 45 (2016) 896–913
industries contributed to RET support coalitions and a credible
‘green growth’ discourse.
The UK has various societal deep structures that favoured the
‘working with incumbents’ pattern and made RET-deployment by
new entrants more difﬁcult.
• The UK has a Westminster political system, which is character-
ized by close-knit policy networks that are relatively open to
incumbent industry actors but remain closed for outsiders and
new entrants (Bailey, 2007). The closed policy networks not only
hinder broad stakeholder engagement, but also facilitate an auto-
cratic, top-down policy style: “The government in the UK is still
meant to govern-full stop. (. . .) The government of the day acts.
Others react. (. . .)  Reforms (. . .)  are not negotiated painstakingly
with stakeholders. They are handed down from above by govern-
ments” (King, 2015: 283).
• The UK’s ‘liberal market economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001)
is characterized by a neo-liberal ideology, which explains the
preference for market-based and non-technology speciﬁc pol-
icy instruments (NFFO, Renewables Obligation), which created
barriers for new entrants. The emphasis on cost efﬁciency also
helps explain the preference for close-to-market (large-scale)
technologies.
• Civil society in the UK has weakened since the 1980s (Marquand,
2004). Although civil society engagement is vocal in some areas
(e.g. animal welfare), it has been muted in the energy domain
where “the level of grassroots activity has been very weak” (Toke,
2005: 373). In recent years, there has been somewhat more civil
society activity (transition towns, community energy initiatives),
leading the government to introduce a Community Energy Strat-
egy in 2014.
• The UK has a weaker environmental tradition than Germany
(Dryzek et al., 2002), although ‘the countryside’ has strong cul-
tural connotations. The UK only has a small Green Party, which is
also due to the ﬁrst-past-the-post voting system.
• The UK has lost many manufacturing industries, which made
it more difﬁcult to develop a credible green industrial strategy,
although policymakers have recently become more interested (as
part of a wider ‘economic rebalancing’ discourse).
6.2. Shifts between transition pathways
A more detailed analysis also reveals shifts between transition
pathways. In Germany, the main shift was from a ‘stretch-
and-transform’ substitution pathway in the second period to a
‘ﬁt-and-conform’ pathway in the third period. In the UK, the main
shift was from limited to more substantial transformation as policy
pressures increased in the third period. These shifts mainly resulted
from struggles over rules in successive periods, which we  brieﬂy
analyse below.
In the ﬁrst period of the German transition, the 1990 Feed-in-
Law provided shielding of new entrants against incumbent utilities,
who fought back through legal contestations that created substan-
tial uncertainty in the late 1990s. Had the courts ruled in favour of
the incumbents, the German transition might have unfolded quite
differently. In the second period, there was a strong push from new
entrants for more RET-support, which the Red-Green government
(1998–2005) was  happy to provide via the EEG, which was a radical
policy that introduced new goals, altered the rules of the game, and
set the substitution pathway on a ‘stretch-and-transform’ course.
The Red-Green government disrupted the previously cosy rela-
tions between utilities and government in some important respects
such as the EEG, the nuclear phase-out decision (2002), and the
transfer of energy policy from the Economics to the Environment
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inistry15. In this period, the utilities tried to delegitimize RETs
hrough discursive strategies (highlighting costs and insecurity),
ut focused more on economic possibilities (take-overs, mergers,
nternational expansion) following liberalization of the electric-
ty sector (1998). The Conservative-Social Democrat government
2005–2009) agreed to continue previous policies because by then
 strong and broad domestic lobby had emerged (Lauber and
acobsson, 2016).
In the third period, incumbent utilities engaged in a strong ﬁght-
ack because RET-competition (combined with the effects of the
ecession and nuclear phase-out) created major ﬁnancial-economic
ifﬁculties. The new Conservative-Liberal coalition (2009–2013)
as sympathetic to their arguments leading to a socio-political dis-
ourse about costs, intermittency and market problems. This led to
ew policies (also under the Conservative-Social Democrat coali-
ion since 2013) that downscaled EEG-support and emphasized
arket and system integration, which changed the transition to a
ﬁt-and-conform’ substitution pathway because RETs are required
o adapt to regime-oriented market rules. The ‘layering’ of capac-
ty market policies even opened prospects for a reconﬁguration
athway in which coal can co-exist with renewables.
Shifts in UK transition pathways mainly refer to changing depths
f incumbent reorientation based on varying policy pressure. In the
rst period, reorientation towards renewables was limited, because
he ad-hoc NFFO policy exerted weak pressure, especially com-
ared to privatisation and the dash-for-gas. In the second period,
eorientation became somewhat more substantial, as the Labour
overnment introduced climate change as an important policy goal
nd introduced the Renewables Obligation, which created pressure
n utilities but also opportunities in terms of investment. Renew-
bles performance remained below targets, however, because the
O was layered onto existing neo-liberal rules and principles and
ad several design ﬂaws. Climate change gained political momen-
um in the mid-2000s, because high-level politicians chose to
ompete on the issue (Carter and Jacobs, 2014), which resulted in
he ambitious 2008 Climate Change Act. The third period was char-
cterized by more interventionist policies with stronger targets
nd attractive ﬁnancial incentives that stimulated more substantial
ngagement from utilities, project developers and investors. How-
ver, the third period also saw a political controversy over rising
nergy prices, which eroded green ambitions.
In July 2015, these political counter-trends culminated in deci-
ions by the newly elected Conservative government to slash
upport for onshore wind, solar-PV (especially 1–5 MW installa-
ions), and biomass plants. Although these policy changes falls
utside the scope of analysis, they are likely to shift the transfor-
ation pathway back to less substantial renewables reorientation.
he government’s long-term vision of a low-carbon transition
eems oriented towards a ‘partial reorientation’ (Table 1), based on
ome large-scale RETs (around 30% of electricity generation), and
xpansion of nuclear power and coal/gas with CCS. These devel-
pments suggest that utilities are likely to remain core actors in
he UK low-carbon transition. More generally, the UK coalition
etween utilities and the government has remained fairly strong
hroughout the period, which helps explain, ﬁrst, why UK renew-
bles policy was formulated to suit the interests of utilities and
reated barriers for new entrants, and, second, why UK climate
olicy envisages a continued role for regime technologies. New
ntrants complained about regulatory and economic entry bar-
iers, but gained limited traction with policymakers. The closed
olicy networks and top-down policies did, however, create pub-
ic controversies in the societal embedding of onshore wind, Big
15 The Red-Green government also made large concessions to the incumbents, for
nstance supporting large mergers despite concerns from cartel authorities.icy 45 (2016) 896–913 911
Biomass and shale gas/fracking because of a ‘bulldozer’ policy style
that pushes through concocted plans rather than consulting with
citizens and societal actors.
7. Conclusions
The paper has made two contributions to the sustainability
transitions literature and in particular the Geels and Schot (2007)
transition pathway typology. First, it has reformulated this typology
in terms of endogenous enactment, articulating the main causal
mechanisms for actors, formal institutions, and technologies. This
reformulation also led to further differentiation of the technological
substitution and transformation pathways. Second, it explored the
possibility of shifts between transition pathways, based on actor
struggles over technology deployment and institutions, and pro-
posed several possible shifts. This second contribution emphasizes
the non-linearity of transitions, which are likely to unfold unevenly
through sudden advances and setbacks, depending on changing
coalitions and contexts, unintended consequences and learning
processes.
Both contributions were supported with a comparative case
study of the unfolding German and UK electricity transitions. The
analysis showed that the German transition so far followed a tech-
nological substitution pattern, which is enacted by new entrants,
deploying mainly small-scale RETs. The UK transition was found to
follow a transformation pathway, which is enacted by incumbent
actors, deploying mainly large-scale RETs. Further analysis showed
that the German transition recently shifted from a ‘stretch-and-
transform’ substitution pathway to a ‘ﬁt-and-conform’ pathway,
because of weakening support policies and system and mar-
ket integration requirements. The UK transition gradually shifted
towards deeper transformation and reorientation patterns, as poli-
cies became stronger and more interventionist. However, recent
politicization of cost concerns and weakening renewables policies
may  trigger a shift back to a less substantial transformation path-
way.
Regarding future developments, we  suggest that German
renewable electricity will continue to expand (although at a slower
rate), because of continued high public legitimacy and an economic
support base. Such expansion will, however, require successful
market and system integration of RETs. For the UK,  we suggest
that the 2020 renewable electricity target (30%) is likely to be
met, because much political capital has been invested. But the
recent downscaling of RET-support is likely to slow down incum-
bent reorientation towards renewables. The UK’s commitment to
low-carbon regime options carries serious risks of not meeting
longer-term climate change targets, because nuclear plans already
experience major delays (at least 5 years), shale-gas exploitation
is more difﬁcult than in the US (and conﬂicts with climate change
targets), and CCS is still commercially uncertain and progressing
slower than anticipated.
We hope that our paper may  open up fruitful areas of future
research such as country-comparative research and ‘comprehen-
sive transition analysis’ that addresses multiple niche-innovations
and the existing regime. We  also think that societal deep struc-
tures (or static landscape characteristics) warrant further attention,
especially for country comparisons. Conceptually, we hope that our
paper leads to further research on patterns of agency in transi-
tion pathways, which goes beyond established dichotomies (such
as new entrants versus incumbents) and which pays attention to
ongoing struggles between actors over institutions and technology
deployment. We  have shown how these struggles (and changing
contexts) may  lead to shifts between transition pathways, which
not only entail steps forwards or backwards, but also shifts in direc-
tion and qualitative characteristics. More work could be done on
9 ch Po
s
h
T
o
u
A
E
b
P
(
F
r
R
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
E
F
F
F12 F.W. Geels et al. / Resear
ystematization of shifts between transition pathways, as our paper
as been somewhat inductive in delineating the phenomenon.
hese issues are particularly fruitful research topics, as struggles
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